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020			_a0521119804 _q(pbk.)
020			_a9780521119801 _q(pbk.)
040			_aUKM _beng _cUKM _dBTCTA _dYDXCP _dGYG _dUN@
082	0	4	_a347.7312 _bZ96d 2009
100	1		_9299649 _aZurn, Christopher F., _d1966- , _eautor
245	1	0	_aDeliberative democracy and the institutions of judicial review / _cChristopher F. Zurn.
264	3	1	_aCambridge : _bCambridge University Press, _c2009.
300			_aviii, 366 páginas
336			_atexto _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_ano mediado _bn _2rdamedia
338			_avolumen _bnc _2rdacarrier
504			_aIncluye bibliografía.
505	0		_aDeliberative majoritarianism and the paternalism of judicial review : Waldron -- Upshot : we need a theory of democratic constitutionalism -- The seducements of juristic discourse as democratic deliberation: A division of labor between juristic deliberation and populist aggregation? -- Actual juristic discourse in the United States system of constitutional adjudication -- Legal principles and moral-political reasoning -- Constitutionalism as the procedural structuring of deliberative democracy: A provisional summary : criteria for an adequate theory of constitutional review -- Guardians of the conditions of procedural legitimacy : Habermas -- The institutions of constitutional review I : design problems and judicial review: The problems of designing institutions of constitutional review -- Independent constitutional courts in a concentrated review system --^
505	0		_aIntroduction: An old chestnut is actually two -- Pathologies of ad hoc triangulation -- Functions and institutions -- Majoritarian democracy and minoritarian constitutionalism: Judicial review as substantially legitimate protection of minority rights -- Judicial review as procedurally legitimate protection of democracy -- Moving beyond aggregative majoritarianism and minoritarian constitutionalism -- From majoritarian to deliberative theories of constitutional democracy: Deliberative democracy : four axes of analysis -- Constitutionalism : four central elements -- Constitutional democracy? -- Deliberative democracy and substantive constitutionalism: Keepers of the substantive flame of American exceptionalism -- Guardians of the moral law in the forum of principle -- Are substantialist defenses of judicial review self-defeating? -- Disagreement and the constitution of democracy: Democratic precommitment to judicial review: freeman --^
505	0		_aThe institutions of constitutional review II : horizontal dispersal and vertical empowerment: Self-review panels in the legislature and regulatory agencies -- Mechanisms for interbranch debate and decisional dispersal -- Easing formal amendability requirements -- Establishing civic consitutional fora.
650	1	4	_943652 _aPoder ejecutivo _zEstados Unidos.
650	1	4	_951017 _aPoder legislativo _zEstados Unidos.
650	1	4	_9349470 _aRevisión judicial. _zEstados Unidos.
942			_2ddc _cGEN
991			_aC0 _bUN@
991			_aDER _aOT13 _aGonzález, Eduardo Román.
997			_aHZ _b00 _c20140722 _lUDM01 _h1029
998			_aBATCH-UPD _b00 _c20150424 _lUDM01 _h0622
999			_c134490 _d134490
900			_aDER