Game theory and the law / edited by Eric B. Rasmusen.

Incluye bibliografía.

Playing games with the law / Ian Ayres -- Review dialog: on game theory and the law / Kenneth Dau-Schmidt, Eric Rasmusen, Jeffrey Evans Stake, Robert H. Heidt and Michael Alexeev -- Agency models in law and economics / Eric A. Posner -- Games economists play: a noncooperative view / Franklin M. Fisher -- Economic analysis of legal disputes and their resolution / Robert D. Cooter and Daniel L. Rubinfeld -- Strategic power in suit, settlement, and trial / I.P.L. P´ng -- Settlement, litigation, and the allocation of litigation costs / Jennifer F. Reinganum and Louis L. Wilde -- A new theory concerning the credibility and success of threats to sue / Lucian Arye Bebchuk -- An economic theory of the duty to bargain / Keith N. Hylton -- Fair driving: gender and race discrimination in retail car negotiations / Ian Ayres -- Strategic contractual inefficiency and the optimal choice of legal rules / Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner -- Explaining incomplete contracts as the result of contract reading costs / Eric B. Rasmusen -- Legal rules in repeated deals: banking in the shadow of defection in Japan / J. Mark Ramseyer -- Toward an economic theory of liability / John Prather Brown -- Decoupling liability: optimal incentives for care and litigation / A. Mitchell Polinsky and Yeon-Koo Che -- The tax compliance game: toward an interactive theory of law enforcement / Michael J. Graetz, Jennifer F. Reinganum and Louis L. Wilde -- The economic theory of public enforcement of law / A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell -- The selection of disputes for litigation / George L. Priest and Benjamin Klein -- A rational choice theory of Supreme Court statutory decisions with applications to the State Farm and Grove City cases / Rafael Gely and Pablo T. Spiller -- Stability and reliability in judicial decisions / Frank H. Easterbrook.